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abstract 
 
Charles Sanders Peirce's ethics is based on his 
pragmaticist theory of meaning elucidated 
by his phenomenology and its transcoding 
into practice. An example of how meaning 
acquires practical effect is cited from Peirce's 
lecture on signs and their interpretation. His 
anti-imperialist stance against U.S. 
colonization of the Philippines has never 
been discussed before. This is the first time 
Peirce's politics is manifested in conjunction 
with his anti-nominalist explanation of signs 
and their ethical implications. 
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Introduction 
 
hen the famous Moscow Trials (1936-38) 
against Trotskyists and other alleged enemies of 
the Soviet Union, pragmatism was still relatively 
an academic affair. Peirce died in 1914; his collected papers 
did not appear until 1931. William James’s popularization 
of Peirce’s ideas, Pragmatism: A New Name for some Old Ways 
of Thinking, was published in 1907. In 1931, John Dewey 
traced “The Development of American Pragmatism” in 
the wake of his major discourses on experimentalism in 
Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), Human Nature and Conduct 
(1922), and Experience and Nature (1925). Not until after 
World War II will Peirce be acknowledged by Bertrand 
Russell and others as the United States’ most wide-ranging, 
innovative and original philosopher. While Peirce could 
not have predicted and commented on the Moscow Trials, 
Dewey found the opportunity to intervene and put his 
mark on the controversy surrounding this memorable 
turning point in revolutionary politics. 
 The Moscow Trials, also known as Stalin’s “Great 
Purge,” exemplified one man’s autocratic rule in a 
totalitarian state. The defendants were charged with 
conspiring with  Western powers to assassinate Stalin, 
dismember the Soviet Union, and restore capitalism. They 
were suspected of exploiting the popular discontent 
brought about by Stalin’s forced collectivization of the 
farms and the political crisis of 1928-33  In May 1937, the 
Commission of Inquiry into the Charges Made Against 
Leon Trotsky, was set up in the United States by Trotsky’s 
friends to establish the truth about the trials. Chaired by 
the now famous philosopher John Dewey, the 
Commission travelled to Mexico to interview Trotsky and 
hold hearings from April 10 to April 17, 1937. 
W 
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 After a thorough examination of evidence, the 
Dewey Commission found all those condemned innocent 
of the charges, dismissing the trials as “frame-ups.”  
Confessions were extracted by torture, blackmail, and 
terror (for analysis of this period, see (Ulam 1973, 410-33). 
Nonetheless, radical intellectuals like Langston Hughes, 
Stuart Davis, Lilian Hellman, Corliss Lamont and others 
approved if not endorsed the outcome of the horrible 
events. Millions involved in the trials were imprisoned or 
executed. Trotsky was assassinated in 1940 by Stalin’s 
agent. In 1956, Kruschev denounced Stalin’s monstrous 
crimes and began the rehabilitation of Stalin’s victims such 
as Bukharin, Zinoviev, etc., as “honest Communists” 
(Garraty and Gay 1972, 1002-1004). In January 1989, the 
official newspaper Pravda reported that 25,000 persons had 
been posthumously rehabilitated. 
 Leon Trotsky, the chief accused in the Moscow 
Trials, wrote a defense of his case in 1938 entitled “Their 
Morals and Ours.”  His primary argument deploys the 
efficacious power of the class struggle in history which 
serves as the rational basis of individual choices and 
decisions. He rejects the ascription to Bolshevism of what 
he calls the Jesuitical maxim of “the end justifying the 
means”; historically, Trotsky contends, the Jesuits 
represented the forces of reaction against the progressive 
Protestants. Eventually, the Jesuits adopted Martin 
Luther’s opportunism by adapting themselves to “the spirit 
of bourgeois society” (1969, 14). Ultimately, Trotsky 
appeals to a universal criterion that can validate the 
legitimacy of group actions: “From the Marxist point of 
view, which expresses the historical interest of the 
proletariat, the end is justified if it leads to increasing the 
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power of man over nature and to the abolition of the 
power of man over man” (1969, 36; see the discritimating 
critique of instrumentalism by Lukes [1985]; see also 
Somerville [1967] for an overview of the problem).What 
Trotsky failed to specify is the historical mission of the 
proletariat, the privileged class, to advance the humanist 
project of developing the capacity of society to control the 
natural environment and adjust social institutions so as to 
fulfill the needs, spiritual and physical, of the majority of 
the toiling masses, outlined in Marx and Engels’ 
“Communist Manifesto” (1968, 31-63). The fundamental 
premise of Marxist ethics is derived from the persistence 
of class antagonism (rooted in contradictory modes of 
production and social formations) as the ultimately 
conditioning rule or principle determining, historically 
contingent consequences that can be judged eiher right and 
wrong, good and evil (Singer 1994, 243-46). 
 
Dewey’s Interpellation 
 
 Dewey’s comment on Trotsky’s polemic 
concerned the putative Marxian gloss on the relation of 
means and ends in social action. Dewey states: “I hold that 
the end in the sense of consequences provides the only 
basis for moral ideas and action, and therefore provides the 
only justification that can be found for means employed” 
(1968, 52). Dewey insists on the close interdependence of 
means and end. He requires actors to perform an 
“unscrupulous examination of the means that are used, to 
ascertain what their actual objective consequences will be 
as far as it is humanly possible to tell—to show that they 
do ‘really’ lead to the liberation of mankind.” The end in 
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view also functions as the means to direct action. But this 
is not a matter of personal belief, Dewey emphasizes,” but 
of the objective grounds upon which it is held: namely, the 
consequences that will actually be produced by them” 
(1968, 53); see the expositions of Shahakian (1963, 318-40); 
and Kaplan (1961, 13-52).  
 Dewey faults Trotsky’s reasoning because it 
invokes “an alleged law of history,” the historical 
movement of the class struggle reduced without taking into 
account what Agnes Heller calls the “ethics of the 
personality and the good” (1984, 163). Instead of an 
inductive investigation of the reciprocity of means-
consequences, Trotsky’s wrongly deduces results from a 
“fixed law of social development.” Dewey concludes that 
“No scientific law can determine a moral end save by 
deserting the principle of interdependence of means and 
end,” so “given the liberation of mankind as end, there is 
free and unprejudiced search for the means by which it can 
be attained” (1968, 55).  
 Rational dialogue and intelligent 
contract/agreement between persons are involved in 
Dewey’s inquiry. While Dewey’s formulation envisages the 
intended results of individual actions, which resemble the 
classic utilitarian consequentialist argument, it also involves 
an experimental analysis of problematic situations, not 
single objects. It engages “the contextual whole of 
experience” which furthers the growth of creative 
intelligence as ”the only moral end” (Talisse and Aikin 
2012, 120). This departs from the orthodox arguments of 
utilitarianism and its variants, as elaborated in Foot (1967) 
and in Weinberg and Yandell (1971). On the surface, there 
is no basic antagonism between Trotsky’s objective of 
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systemic change and Dewey’s reconstructive improvement 
of the system via educational reform. Nonetheless, 
Bernstein judges Dewey’s program as insufficiently radical 
because “he underestimates the powerful social, political, 
and economic forces that distort and corrupt” his ideal of 
expansive creative intelligence (1971, 228). I think 
Bernstein’s opinion ignores the nuanced evaluation he 
made in his earlier introduction to Dewey’s philosophy 
(1960, ix-xlvii). 
 
The Peircean Difference 
 
 How would the philosopher Charles Sanders 
Peirce, Dewey’s friend, treat this situation? Peirce’s 
evaluation of Trotsky’s ethical standard would concur with 
Dewey’s logic of experimental inquiry in line with the 
pragmatic maxim of appraising conceivable practical 
effects (Scheffler 1974). But Peirce’s position would differ 
in three respects (discussed further below): 1) Knowledge 
of values (good or bad) depends on mediation via the 
intersubjectivity of interpreters, or community of inquirers; 
2) Hypothetical reasoning is a process mediated through 
signs oriented to the future, the counterfactual discovery 
of the coincidence of truth and reality in the long run; and 
3) Mediation of the theoretical by the practical is carried 
out from the horizon of the ‘ethical, as ‘socialist logic,’ by 
history and commonsense” (Dussel 2013, 162).  
 The Latin-American philosopher Enrique Dussel  
affirms a solidarity between Peircean pragmatism and the 
ethics of liberation gounded in the life of the subject as  
“the ultimate uncircumventable criterion of truth” (2013, 
172). For Peirce, the human subject is the purposive 
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community of inquirers cognizant of the role of chance  
(tychism) in a universe governed by continuous 
possibilities (synechism). Values cannot be separated from 
the teleology of active interpretants (Short 2007, 344-47). 
By way of Peirce’s evolutionary cosmology, the historical 
field of forces enters the investigation of ideal ends that 
inform the normative science of ethics. The ethical will of 
the scientist can unite with evolutionary love, the eros of 
the universe, in a temporal process of search and discovery 
(Peirce 1992, 352-71).  
 Logic and ethics are therefore rooted in a social 
principle, what Dussel calls “the processual reality of the 
corporeality of the life of the cultural, historical, and 
human subject” (2013, 162). Moreover, Peirce’s discourse 
on “evolutionary love” amplifies the argument for a 
knowable reality, the liberation of human powers in a 
future consensus that would witness the fulfillment of the 
hypothesis of the unity of truth and reality in historical 
time. Evolution defines the parameter of ethical judgment. 
The formation of habits or rational conduct (beliefs 
translated into action) which mediate mind and matter, 
chance and law, demonstrates the evolutionary tendency of 
the world toward concrete reasonableness. In this context, 
the inquiring sensibility manifests a moral character equal 
to that of the self-sacrificing heroes of revolutionary 
struggles in history, as Peirce reflects: “At the very lowest, 
a man must prefer the truth to his own interests and well-
being and not merely to his bread and butter, and to his 
own vanity, too, if he is to do much in science”(CP1.157). 
 In what follows, I explore the interanimation of 
Peirce’s ideas of liberty and concrete reasonableness 
achieved through self-control. The summum bonum is the 
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ethical destiny of “the reasoner’s aspirations,” a social good 
equivalent to the liberation of humanity and the fulfillment 
of universal physical and spiritual needs. Reasoning, for 
Peirce, is a form of controlled conduct—the locus of 
ethical wisdom—whereby a person can “make his life 
more reasonable. What other distinct idea than that, I 
should be glad to know, can be attached to the word 
liberty” (1998a, 248). This encapsulates Peirce’s dialectic of 
thought and action, theory and praxis. We need to 
contextualize this theme in terms of how pragmatism has 
been publicly received and appraised before citing a 
particular instance of its application. 
 
 
Clearing the Ground 
 
 By consensus, Peirce laid the groundwork for 
pragmatism as scientific theory, later vulgarized by 
psychologist William James so that Peirce himself in 1905 
rechristened his view “pragmaticism.” In 1878, Peirce 
proposed a way of ascertaining the meaning of words in 
propositions. He said: “Consider what effects, which might 
conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object 
of our conception to have. Then our conception of these 
effects is the whole of our conception of the object” 
(1998a, 135).  James, however, misconstrued this as a 
theory of truth so that ideas prove their truth “just so far 
as they help us get into satisfactory relations with other 
parts of our experience,” manifesting their “practical cash 
value” (1982, 213), and thus converting it into an 
instrumentalist if not subjectivist, idealist notion. This is 
how the Soviet Union scholars treated James’s pragmatic 
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truth as valid on the basis of practical utility which 
“understands not confirmation of objective truth by the 
criterion of practice, but what meets the subjective 
interests of the individual” (1967, 358). Such a 
transmogrification of Peirce’s philosophy  into a mode of 
bourgeois instrumentalism speaks volumes about 
totalitarian state dogmatism (San Juan 2017). 
            For Peirce, truth can only be legitimately pursued 
by the cooperative work of inquirers committed to a 
socially constructive goal, not by isolated individuals. 
Peirce argues that the private self has no intuitive or 
introspective faculty allowing access to cognitive insights. 
“Self” is a hypothesis needed to account for errors, 
ignorance, inadequacies (Appel 1981). In short, the 
monadic ego/persona is cognized through mistakes,   
misconstruals, fallibility. Opposed to philosophies of 
consciousness (inspired by psychoanalysis or Heideggerian 
ontology), Peirce posited mind as comprised of the 
complex articulation of feeling (Firstness), reaction or 
contradiction (Secondness), and rules of learning or 
representation connecting the first two (Thirdness). We 
elucidate further this dialogic hermeneutics of the mind 
and its ramifications later on. 
 That banal misconstrual of pragmaticism degrades 
even a sophisticated survey such as Contemporary European 
Philosophy by Polish Dominican scholar I.M. Bochenski, an 
expert on Soviet dialectical materialism. Bochenski opined 
that pragmatism denied the existence of a “purely 
theoretical knowledge” since it reduced “the true to the 
useful” (1969, 114). Following that repeated doxa, 
pragmatism is considered synonymous with utilitarianism, 
instrumentalism, even opportunism. In contrast, Peirce’s 
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texts insist that both reason and experience are 
symbiotically operative in pragmaticism. Essentially, Peirce 
proposed a method for clarifying the differences among 
ideas through anticipating their conceivable future 
practical effects, even discordant or incongruous sensible 
effects that evince practical significance. In “The Fixation 
of Belief,” Peirce distinguished between belief as action-
guiding disposition, and doubt that disrupts usual 
behavioral patterns but also “stimulates enquiry in the 
struggle to attain [revised] belief” (Flew 1979, 245). Not 
action for action’s sake, but deliberate action socially 
legitimized with rational purport, is what Peirce upheld as 
a fundamental principle in scientific research. 
 For a long time, this tendency to foist all kinds of 
excesses on pragmatism ran wild. Peirce’s notion has been 
equated with diverse philosophical schools, among them: 
radical empiricism, irrationalism, meliorism, “apology for 
bourgeois democracy” (a charge against John Dewey made 
by mechanical/vulgar Marxists), experimental naturalism, 
neopositivism, semantic idealism, operationalism,  and 
Hans Vaihinger’s “as-if” conjectures (Wheelwright 1960, 
138).   Assorted thinkers, aside from James and Dewey, 
were held complicit: F.C.S. Schiller, Sidney Hook, C.W. 
Morris, P.W. Bridgman, C.I. Lewis, R. Carnap, W. Quine, 
etc. 
 While generally correct in summarizing Peirce’s 
early view, the famous dissident philosopher Leszek 
Kolakowski wrongly labels Peirce a positivist, nominalist 
and scientistic. And so he ascribes to Peirce a rather ascetic, 
puritanical stance nowhere to be found in Peirce’s rich, 
wide-ranging speculations: “The world contains no 
mystery, merely problems to be solved” (1969, 154). But 
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this simplification obfuscates rather than illuminates 
Peirce’s rejection of nominalism, nihilist relativism, and 
pseudo-pragmatic antifoundationalism (exemplified by 
Richard Rorty), which all subscribe to absolutizing 
subjectivity exceeding even the metaphysical thesis of 
William of Ockham, the historical originator of 
nominalism (Hookway 1985; Peirce 1997). 
 
Prologue to Intervention 
 
 Before delineating Peirce’s dialectical reflections, I 
want to counter the equally wrongheaded notion that he 
was politically conservative if not indifferent to social 
controversy. Of course, being part of the Cambridge elite, 
Peirce’s family shared the values of intellectuals such as 
William James, William Dean Howells, Mark Twain, and 
his friends in the Metaphysical Club (circa 1870-1872). 
While Peirce shared his father’s prejudiced view on slavery, 
the father changed his views at the beginning of the Civil 
War. Louis Menand’s thorough study of this milieu, The 
Metaphysical Club, argues that Peirce finally opposed 
economic individualism and determinism, affirming the 
indeterminacy and intelligibility of the cosmos. While 
affected by a conservative climate of opinion, Peirce and 
his associates all defied conventional expectations. 
 None of the two extant biographies (Brent 1998; 
Ketner 1998) mentions Peirce’s attitude to the bloody 
conquest of the Philippines which this essay, for the first 
time, foregrounds vis-a-vis Peirce’s categorial paradigm. 
Only James and Twain of the major American intellectuals 
conscientiously deplored U.S. imperialism and aligned 
themselves with the plight of the Filipino people at that 
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time. Even Peirce’s conformity to the genteel New 
England morality of his day (or the Emersonian 
transcendentalism then in vogue) needs to be qualified by 
his unequivocal dismissal of morality as “essentially 
conservative” (Collected Papers (afterward CP) 1.50; 
Liszka 2012). Morality as petrified folkway is 
contradistinguished from ethics as a study of what we 
ought to do according to a universal principle, independent 
of what the status quo obliges or forces one to do.  
 Contrary to the biographic accounts, Peirce was 
not totally indifferent to the crises surrounding him. In 
fact, he characterized his epoch as “the Economical 
Century; for political economy has more direct relations 
with all the branches of its activity than has any other 
science” (CP 6.290). Echoing the oppositional sentiments 
of writers like Henry James (whose friendship he enjoyed 
in Paris in 1876), Peirce was nauseated by the rapacious 
individualism pervading that rapidly industrializing era of 
Reconstruction. He denounced specifically “the 
Americanism, the worship of business, the life in which the 
fertilizing stream of genial sentiment dries up or shrinks to 
a rill of comic tit-bits, or else on the other hand to 
monasticism, sleepwalking in this world with no eye nor 
heart except for the other” (CP 1.673). The prophetic 
socialist scholar Cornel West concisely sums up Peirce’s 
anti-Establishment sensibility and world-outlook: “The 
historic emergence of American pragmatism principally 
results from Peirce’s profound evasion of ‘the spirit of 
Cartesianism’ owing to his obsession with the procedures 
of the scientific community, his loyalty to a Christian 
doctrine of love, and the lure of community in the midst 
of anomic Gesellschaften of urban, industrial capitalist 
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America” (1989, 49; for its interface with semiotic 
deonstruction, see Muller and Brent [2000]). 
 
Anti-Monopoly Capitalist Wrath 
 
 William James, Peirce’s closest friend, was one of 
the leading founders of the Anti-Imperialist League. In 
March 1899, James sent a letter to the newspaper Boston 
Evening Transcript bewailing the horrible, “unspeakable 
meanness” of President McKinley’s treatment of 
Aguinaldo’s government: “Could there be a more damning 
indictment of that whole blasted idol termed ‘modern 
civilization’…? Civilization is then, the big, hollow, 
resounding, corrupting, sophisticating, confusing torrent 
of mere brutal momentum and irrationality…” (1972, 225). 
Later on, another progressive member of the League, the 
novelist Mark Twain followed with an ironic boast that he 
was now proud of the flag after the slaughter of 900 
rebellious Moros (including women and children) in the 
Battle of Mount Dajo, Philippines, on March 9, 1906 
(Zwick 1207, 131). Adding the figure of 500 Muslims killed 
by General John Pershing in June 1913 at Mount Bagsak 
in the same province of Sulu, Philippines, the total number 
of Filipinos killed in the Filipino-American War of 1899-
1913 amounted to over one million (Francisco 1987, 19; 
for more background, see Hofstadter 1967; Miller 1982). 
 Peirce joined colleagues, among them, James, 
Twain, William Dean Howells, Andrew Carnegie, John 
Dewey, Jane Addams, Samuel Gomper, etc., in denouncing 
U.S. aggression with a pungent satiric address to his pro-
imperialist cousin Senator Henry Cabot Lodge: “All men 
are entitled to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. No 
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Phillipino is entitled to life, liberty and the pursuit of 
happiness. Hence, no Phillipino is a man” (quoted in Brent 
1998, 266).  This mock-syllogistic quip was a decorous 
understatement of the ongoing carnage in the Pacific rim. 
 Peirce could not remain indifferent in his 
retirement years. In 1903, during the bloody pacification of 
the Philippines, after thousands of Filipinos have been 
killed, tortured, and starved by the “scorched earth” tactics 
of technologically superior U.S. troops, Peirce once more 
expressed his criticism obliquely in a talk explaining 
generality, Thirdness or mediation. He is referring to a 
general principle operative in the real world, in which 
words produce physical effects, such as those of the 
revolutionary hero Patrick Henry asserting how three 
million Americans, “armed in the holy cause of 
Liberty,…are invincible against any force that the enemy 
can bring against us.” Its generality conformed to the 
synechistic architectonic of his teleology. 
 Peirce apprehends in Henry’s words a “general law 
of nature” transcending the initial circumstances of their 
making: “it might. for example, have happened that some 
American schoolboy, sailing as a passenger in the Pacific 
Ocean, should have idly written down those words on a 
slip of paper. The paper might have been tossed overboard 
and might have been picked up by some Tagala on a beach 
of the island of Luzon; and if he had them translated to 
him they might easily have passed from mouth to mouth 
there as they did in this country, and with similar effect” 
(1991, 245). The “Tagala” on the beach is a trope for 
migrant possibilities. In Peirce’s speculative guess-work 
which he calls “abduction”, any prediction of what would 
happen in any working out of a project or unplanned event 
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is enabled by general laws of nature immanent in 
regularities occurring in life. Consequently, “a true-would-
be is as real as an actuality” (1998a, 451). The impossible 
hypothesis becomes possible, actualizable. 
     In effect, ideas beget agendas, suggestions, 
recommendations for vital, aspirational agents. Possibility 
turns into actualizations and processes of performing 
experiments. Such actions are a product of self-controlled, 
deliberate judgment taking a critical position on issues of 
the day. A more accurate precis of the implied politics in 
Peirce’s views was offered by Donald McKay: “Instead of 
elaborating theories about passive “states” of knowledge in 
a knowing mind, or ‘contents’ of knowledge within its own 
fixed and immutable ‘forms,’ pragmatism offered a 
working hypothesis concerning the practice of knowledge in 
‘the real business of living’ (1950, 398). For Peirce, 
meanings and values are discovered through inference, 
informed guessing, pragmatism as “the logic of abduction” 
(Brent 1998, 349). 
 It is clear that Peirce’s theory of meaning, when 
communication takes place, carries an ethical and political 
charge, an agenda. Immanent to every hypothesis is a 
network of “conceivable practical effects,” i.e.,meanings. 
After describing the interlinked steps in the process of 
apprehending experience, we will trace the conversion of 
thought into action in the constellation of logical 
inferences. Whether this demonstrates a materialist 
dialectics that approximates Marx’s critique of Hegel’s 
method, remains to be seen. Hegel’s Geist is basically 
mediation or generalizability, Peirce’s Thirdness emerging 
from connectng Firstness and Secondness (Taylor  1975, 
104-06). Meanwhile, we need to parse the dynamics of 
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Peirce’s phenomenology as the matrix of his triadic theory 
of signs. Can Peirce’s semiotics be a feasible foundation for 
a radical politics? 
 
Architectonic of Mediation 
 
 Not problem-solving or Cartesian methodical 
doubting but acquiring knowledge of reality by fallible 
means, is Peirce’s paramount aim. Peirce refuted 
Cartesianism as the source of foundational metaphysics in 
key essays such as “Questions Concenrning Certain 
Faculties Claimed for Man” and “Some Consequences of 
Four Incapacities” (1998b. 66-118). To anticipate 
doubters, truth for Peirce designates knowledge of the real 
(universals mediated in experienced particulars) in 
everyday life.  
      In “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce formulated 
a convergence theory of truth/reality: “The opinion which 
is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is 
what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in 
this opinion is real” (1998a, 155). Meaning is a thought-
experiment, a virtual fruit of the transformation and 
interpretation of signs in ongoing dialogue. For a Peircean 
truth-seeker, “every intelligible question” will be answered 
provided it is “sufficiently investigated by observation and 
reasoning” resulting in a belief implemented by habitual 
action, by a future-oriented construction of reasoned 
discourse and purposive conduct by the participating 
groups involved. 
 Our hypothesis about reality, articulated in 
language/discourse, can converge with the real in the long 
term, in principle and perhaps in practical terms. This 
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fallibilist stance is shared by a community of inquirers, so 
that the pursuit of knowledge/truth implies a collective, 
social responsibility (see Appel 1995). Moreover, in 
contradistinction to James and Dewey who subsumed the 
scientific quest for truth to the demands of immediate 
human interests, ideals and problematic situations, 
Peircean scholastic realism dictates that these knowledge-
claims are ultimately controlled by the structure of reality. 
As Hilary Putnam reminds us, for Peirce, “it is precisely by 
prescinding from all practical interests that science 
succeeds” (1992, 74). Reality can prove or disprove 
hypotheses (inductive, deductive, retroductive) violating 
laws, observed patterns of regularities, etc. Science 
confirms possibilities by experiment, testing, inquiry. 
 Except as ancillary topic (validating truth-claims), 
my chief aim here is to investigate the presence of a 
dialectical logic in Peirce’s speculations that can ground a 
program of political transformation. By dialectic here I 
refer to the application of a method or process of 
reasoning to comprehend the material world, its laws and 
principles, as well as the movement of society/history. In 
Hegel’s dialectic, the process of cognition occupies center-
stage as a “grasping of opposites in their unity or of the 
positive in the negative” (Findlay 1958, 62).  
        In this context, categories or forms of 
consciousness emerge from each other to constitute more 
inclusive totalities, whereby contradictions are resolved 
through their incorporation (by sublation) in fuller and 
more concrete universal conceptual wholes. The truth 
results from the unfolding of the whole dialectical process, 
making explicit what is implicit, articulating antagonisms 
into tense unities. Roy Bhaskar notes that in contrast to 
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reflective or analytical thought, Hegelian dialectics “grasps 
conceptual forms in their systematic interconnections, not 
just their determinate differences, and conceives each 
development as the product of a previous less developed 
phase, whose necessary truth or fulfillment it is; so that 
there is always a tension, latent irony or incipient surprise 
between any form and what it is in the process of 
becoming” (1983,122). Peirce’s pragmatism concretely 
exemplifies this process of actualization. 
 We stress the fact that this interpretation rejects the 
banal, mechanistic notion of a three-step procedure of 
thesis-antithesis-synthesis which Walter Kaufmann (1972) 
already refuted a long time ago. Of course, as everyone 
knows, Marx stood Hegel’s idealism on its head (the 
epistemic fallacy of reducing being to knowing), purging 
the mystical shell of the self-motivating kernel, and 
unsettling the hypostatized, reified or eternalized realm of 
thought. Marx refuses the Hegelian Absolute, Idea or Spirit 
in favor of becoming, of an ontological stratification 
evinced in a complex, concretely articulated material 
history. Marx also emphasized historically causal, not 
conceptual, necessity; he also limited teleology to human 
praxis and its rational explanation. This is not the occasion 
to elaborate fully on Engel’s version of dialectics as the 
science of the general laws of motion and development of 
nature, human society, and thought, elaborated in Anti-
Duhring and Dialectics of Nature (on Marx and Engel’s 
dialectic, see Bhaskar 1993, 87-99). 
 As a scientist-philosopher, Peirce was concerned 
not just with an adequate theory of meaning, the 
signification of ideas, for the terminology of conceptual 
thinking. He was grappling with the validity of scientific 
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laws for which the nature of potentiality, possibility, is 
central in proving hypotheses. This demanded a whole 
metaphysics of being, of reality, and the status of 
universals, which would ground his pragmaticism. Thus, he 
would be engaged in the formulation of categories 
necessary for substantiating science and knowledge.   
      Peirce’s ultimate position on the controversy between 
nominalism and realism is a moderate realist one. From 
this angle, general concepts found in our grasp of meaning 
are real, with a counterpart in the percept, the equivalent in 
consciousness of a Firstness present in the perceived 
object. Peirce was neither a realist nor idealist in the 
orthodox sense, for he neither focused on hypothesis as 
solely deduction (rationalism), nor hypothesis as solely 
induction (empiricism).  His pragmaticism was a fallibilist 
inquiry via abduction or inferential reasoning, in a world 
evolving lawfully in a sea of contingencies (Russell 1959, 
277).  But this is to proceed ahead of our exposition, so let 
us review Peirce’s categories. 
 
Syncopation and Dissonance 
 
 In December 1897, Peirce wrote to James about 
the Cambridge lectures he would deliver in which he 
mentions that his Categories—Quality, Reaction, 
Representation or Mediation—will show “wherein my 
objective logic differs from that of Hegel” (1992, 24). 
Peirce agreed with Hegel that the science of 
phenomenology is basic to the foundation of the 
normative sciences (logic, ethics, aesthetics). But Hegel’s 
“fatally narrow spirit” gave it the nominalistic and 
“pragmatoidal” character, dismissing the irrational qualities 
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and recalcitrant contingencies in experience. This is what 
Theodor Adorno (2017) criticizes as Hegel’s obsession 
with systematizing totality, Spirit’s absolute identity and 
reconciliation of subject/object in Absolute Knowledge. 
Peirce adds that Hegel overlooked or forgot that “there is 
a real world with real actions and reactions” (CP 1.368). To 
my knowledge, Peirce has not read Marx’s critique of 
Hegel, but his theory of mediation (the triadic process of 
logic as semiotics) concurs with Marx’s thesis that “the 
question whether objective truth can be attributed to 
human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical 
question. In practice, man must prove the truth, that is, the 
reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking” (1968, 
28). 
 We intend to mark the dialectical passage of 
thought via Peirce’s triadic schema of classifying domains 
of experience. Thought or understanding, by its nature, 
begets contradiction and is therefore dialectical, Hegel 
asserts. Not only thought but everything surrounding us: 
“We are aware that everything finite, instead of being stable 
and ultimate, is rather changeable and transient; and this is 
exactly what we mean by that Dialectic of the finite, by 
which the finite, is. Implicitly other than what it is, it is 
forced beyond its own immediate or natural being to turn 
suddenly into its opposite” (Hegel 1904, 150).    
          Analogously, Peirce’s dialectics is the movement of 
thought (inferential reasoning) from the first immediate 
content of observation that is posited only to be 
differentiated into a subject and predicate of judgment, this 
mediation in turn sublated or integrated in a concluding 
belief (Mure 1940). All three stages of reflection, while 
analytically discriminated as discrete moments, are present 
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simultaneously at the end of the pragmatic process of 
abduction which is an articulated, self-moving totality. It 
includes the transition from theory to practice, ideas to 
actions. 
 Peirce declared that his phenomenology will not 
just analyze experience but “extend it to describing all the 
features that are common to whatever is experienced or 
might conceivably be experienced or become an object of 
study in any way direct or indirect” (1998a, 143). 
Potentiality and the virtual future occupy center-stage. 
Peirce claims that he arrived at his universal categories 
independently, although in his contempt for Hegelianism, 
the German philosopher might have exercised an “occult 
influence” on him. Indeed, Peirce admits that Hegel’s three 
stages of thought as “roughly speaking, the correct list of 
Universal Categories” (1998a, 148). Peirce also claimed 
that his categories differ from those of Aristotle, Kant and 
Hegel in that they never paid serious examination to what 
can be observed in phenomena (phanerons), universally 
applying to anything we can think of (the possible, the 
utopian, the variegated cosmos of phantasy). Hence 
Peirce’s pragmatism is more inclusive. 
 
Parsing Peirce’s Dialectics 
 
 We summarize here Peirce’s revised theory of 
categories of experience, and phases of thinking linked to 
them, in his late period (1903-1914): Firstness, Secondness, 
and Thirdness as “phaneroscopic categories” (Peirce 
1998a, 145-169). The internal relations among these three, 
the process of their unfolding, parallel the Hegelian “self-
supersession of the finite determinations of the 
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Understanding” (Findlay 1958, 60). However, the central 
movements of contradiction and sublation in the dialectic 
are governed by logical criteria and empirical constraints; 
hence, the labors of negation and mediation are not 
representations of Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, of Substance as 
Subject (Hegel 1977, 14), but the activities of cooperative 
participants reasoning about the validity of inferences and 
hypotheses, the community of calculating experimenters. 
In short, there is a world out there heedless of what you, I, 
or any other person thinks about it which is our field of 
inquiry. 
  Firstness is “quality of feeling,” which is “the true 
psychical representative of the first category of the 
immediate as it is in its immediacy, of the present in its 
direct positive presentness” (1988a, 149-50; CP 8.328). The 
idea here is not actual but potential, a possibility. It cannot 
be compared to Plato’s hypostatized Forms, but it is not a 
thought in some mind; it is between a mere nothing and an 
existent, therefore a possibility to become actual when it 
enters the mind by virtue of experience. For example, a 
possible sense experience such as a color sensation, 
“blueness,” or sensation such as a toothache—possibilities 
that may become actual. The process of actualization 
transpires in the attention given to the sequence of the 
embodiment of qualities apprehended by the experient. 
Hegel dismissed the irrationality of Firstness, the indefinite 
possibilities in the future implied by chance happenings in 
experience, as an aspect of Firstness. 
 Firstness as Presentness includes the irreducible 
variety and plurality of things, both actual and virtual. In 
Peirce’s comment on the U.S. colonial incursion across the 
Pacific Ocean, the scenario of Patrick Henry’s words 
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appearing on a piece of paper and then thrown into the sea 
functions as part of Firstness, which is what it is. Its 
floating on the sea, its fortuitous salvaging by a Tagala, its 
transfer to translators, and its hermeneutic application, can 
be treated separately as elements of Firstness.  Each 
transient feeling shades off into another, producting 
Reaction (Secondness). However, as Peirce notes, “that 
one is logically two as part of its conception” (quoted by 
de Waal 2013, 41). One divides into two. In Hegelian 
dialectics, this one-sided determination of the finite is 
immanently transcended in its negation: the debris is 
negated as something opposed to it, something not wasted, 
now appropriated. Possibilities (feelings, qualities) 
populate Firstness. 
 Secondness is briefly reaction, brute force, struggle 
or conflict as dyadic relation. It is “the Idea of that which 
is such as it is as being Second to some First, regardless of 
anything else and in particular regardless of any law, 
although it may conform to a law,… Reaction as an 
element of the Phenomenon” (CP 8.328). An example of 
Secondness is the existing object, the embodiment of 
qualities (Firstness)—not yet actualized until experienced 
by some mind, whereby the qualities become percepts, an 
image or feeling. This process of actualization (the Tagala’s 
discovery of Patrick Henry’s signs and thei subsequent 
interpretation and dissemination) is complex and the topic 
of ongoing psychological inquiry.  
          Hegel discounted this level of the immediate “hic et 
nunc of sense perception” by subsuming it to general 
concepts in the transition from the doctrine of Being to the 
doctrine of the Notion. By doing so, Peirce contends that 
Hegel valorized for philosophy “only the world of 
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completed facts, the past, and not the real possibilities of 
things, esse in futuro” (Peirce 1998a, 358-59). For Peirce, the 
future as event or sequence of realization of what is 
intended, based on past discoveries and current habits, is 
what matters most in carrying out scientific research.  
 Secondness is the realm of contingency, the 
accidentally actual and unconditional necessity, the reign of 
brute force (Gallie 1952, 197). In the case of Peirce’s piece 
of paper floating in the ocean (thrown out or blown by 
accident from a ship), Secondness involves reaction—
whirled into the ocean as debris, then its discovery by a 
Tagala in a Philippine beach, seemingly occasioned by “a 
blind force.” Existence of this object goes through struggle 
and competition for recognition. 
 Meanwhile, unexpected otherness enters the scene. 
Opposites interpenetrate, leading to some kind of 
temporary reconciliation (Ollman 2003). Everything finite 
is what it is by its negation, by its sublation: debris becomes 
the vehicle of a message in its eventual Thirdness. An 
adventuring Tagala encounters that floating debris. That 
paper with Henry’s words then becomes 
translated/interpreted, an instance of mediation or 
Thirdness. The iconic object becomes, for the interpretant, 
an index of a historic event parallel to the Filipino 
resistance to barbaric colonialism. Something from the 
U.S. historical archive or memory is grasped as contrary to 
what the Empire’s troops are doing in the Philippines, the 
antithesis of Henry’s idea of the American people’s will to 
self-determination against the British empire (Zinn 1980; 
Kolko 1984).  
 Surely, this hypothetical narrative drawn from 
Peirce’s lecture does not imply that the American patriot is 
 
 
25 
                           PEIRCE’S ETHICS 
MABINI REVIEW      I       VOLUME 7 (2018) 
 
the only source of the idea of liberty, of the struggle for 
national sovereignty. It is a hypothetical intervention. What 
is conveyed is the irony of the ideals of the American 
revolution presumably giving support to the Filipino 
resistance against U.S. aggression.  Possibilities are diverse: 
either the signs fail to induce purposive conduct, or stay 
dormant until future use, or incite urgent mobilization. 
What the Filipinos will do if they examine thoughtfully 
Henry’s words concerning the popular struggle for 
liberation is what really matters.  If interpretation of signs 
leads to conceivable purposive praxis, then one progressive 
step in the evolution of concrete reasonableness in the 
world is accomplished. Entire communities stand to 
benefit from this continuum of dialogue and exchange of 
serviceable, utilizable ideas. 
 
Hermeneutics of Praxis 
 
 We now approach the moment of sublation, 
Hegel’s Aufhebung or self-transcendence, a movement in 
thought which negates one part, preserves another part, 
and synthesizes them in a new standpoint. Thirdness is the 
“Idea of that which is such as being a Third, or Medium, 
between a Second and its First….Representation as an 
element of the Phenomenon,”  containing the concept of 
“True Continuity.”  (Peirce 1998b,150,160). Thirdness 
designates a general concept, the universal idea abstracted 
from the percept found in the first and second moments, 
which Peirce also calls “generals.” According to Richard 
Robin, “Peirce’s metaphysical realism, then, consists in his 
view that the general concepts that go to make up 
meanings are real…They have a real external counterpart 
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in the percept—which is the equivalent in consciousness 
of a firstness present in the perceived object” (1998b, 11). 
Every concept (Thirdness) refers to a sense-percept 
(Secondness) to bear some meaning (the real, the 
conceivable practical effect or consequence).  
 No concept is meaningful unless it refers to sense-
experience, which is subjected to attention and abstracting 
elements from the percept to generate concepts expressed 
in a judgement, such as “This orchid is crimson.” 
“Crimson” is not a fiction of the imagination but a quality 
possessed by things in the world. “Crimson” can be 
predicated of many other things, hence it is a real general, 
that is, the crimson of an orchid is not identical with the 
crimson of blood, but they are similar. As long as there is 
something in the physical world that exemplifies particular 
qualities (not all of the particularizing determinations of 
generic and specific qualities ascribed to objects), the 
concept containing them is a real concept. This refutes all 
allegations that Peirce reduced everything to mind or 
rationality.  These three modes of reality, categories of 
being or three universes of experience, provide the 
coordinates for Peirce’s epistemology as well as his singular 
theory of pragmaticism. 
 Applied to that salvaged piece of paper with 
Patrick Henry’s statement, we have an instance of 
mediation when the words are translated and made 
intelligible. The power of that piece of paper to represent 
a historic event (the American revolution and its 
justification) is expressed as a transaction between object 
(signifier or representamen) and the message (signified) by 
the interpretant—the discoverer/translator, which stands 
for a transindividual/collective agency. There are various 
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modes of interpretants conforming to plural historic 
contexts and empirical situations. The experience of 
Thirdness is the encounter with the intelligible, “concrete 
reasonableness,” which for Peirce, becomes the ground for 
humans taking action to change what is irrational, illogical, 
and inhumane. This is an example of Peirce’s political 
intervention into that crucial juncture of U.S-Philippines 
relations. 
 
Toward Alternative Transformations 
 
 What is the relevance and applicability of Peirce’s 
categories to the understanding of political or social 
change? How is pragmatism connected to the normative 
sciences of logic, ethics, and aesthetics?  Cheryl Misak and 
Richard Bernstein have speculated on Peirce’s implicit 
ethical and political outlook based on his pragmaticist 
principles. They both quote Peirce’s propositions: 
“Thinking is a kind of action, and reasoning is a kind of 
deliberate action; and to call an argument illogical, or a 
proposition false, is a special kind of moral judgment,” and 
“He who would not sacrifice his own soul to save the 
whole world, is illogical in all his inferences, collectively” 
(cited in Misak 2004, 170, 173).  Everyone commends 
Peirce’s final affirmation of “concrete reasonableness” as 
the highest good that all our intentions, projects, and acts 
should strive for. In short, ethics and politics are, in 
reciprocal interchange with  Peirce’s epistemology, realized 
in an evolving semiotics. 
 Peirce’s cognitivism, in the larger context of his 
metaphysics, is based on his evolutionary cosmology in 
which chance and necessity coalesce. No doubt, thought 
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controlled by rational experimental logic is what Peirce 
valued in the conduct of marshalling evidence and 
argument for fallible but workable beliefs. No doubt also, 
Peirce rejected Cartesian intuitionism and James’s and 
Dewey’s  psychologizing of his pragmatic maxim in favor 
of self-control and self-criticism (Bernstein 2010). 
Anarchic individualism is also ruled out because public 
deliberation and consensus are needed for effective social 
changes in habits and modes of thinking of citizens. In 
short, genuine revolution is a totalizing process. 
 Lest readers again impute individualistic bias to 
Peirce, we emphasize that reflexivity can only take place 
within a definite community of persons engaged in critical 
inquiry, a “community without definite limits,” which 
functions as a regulative ideal in pragmaticism. Bernstein 
asserts that the social character of the individual is defined 
by the forms of participation in community life, citing 
Peirce’s insight: “A person is not absolutely an individual. 
His thoughts are what he is ‘saying to himself,’ that is, is 
saying to that other self that is just coming to life in the 
flow of time. When one reasons, it is that critical self that 
one is trying to persuade; and all thought whatsoever is a 
sign, and is mostly of the nature of language” (Bernstein 
1971, 190). We are confronted here not just with 
deliberative pluralist exchange, discursive debate or 
communication, but also with collective programs for 
institutional changes toward genuine participatory 
democracy. 
 What is indisputable is the gravity of Peirce’s civic-
minded or communalist sympathies. In the final analysis, 
the mobilized community of inquirers—activists in 
performing critical self-control and realistic orientation of 
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behavior—is the chief protagonist in Peirce’s political 
world-view. This protagonist is the transindividual organic 
intellectual in Antonio Gramsci’s (1971) politics and the 
proletarian party in George Lukacs’ (1971) dialectics. 
Reason as Aristotelian energy engenders the action 
imitated by discourse.  
     We cannot elaborate here on Peirce’s theory of 
evolutionary change, on synechism and tychism in which 
the role of chance or accident functions as the matrix of 
innovation, radical transformation, and the pursuit of 
concrete universality requiring the “absence of self-
conceit” (West 1989, 51; Smith 1966). That remains for 
another occasion, but a brief summary is appropriate here. 
For Peirce, the development of Reason is the fundamental 
motivation behind social progress, the aesthetic ideal 
governing ethics and logic: “The one thing whose 
admirableness is not due to an ulterior reason is Reason 
itself comprehended in all its fulness as far as we can 
comprehend it….The ideal of conduct will be to execute 
our little function in the operation of the creation by giving 
a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable 
whenever, as the slang is, it is “up to us” to do so” (1998a, 
255). 
 
The Responsibility of Intellectuals 
 
      In the context of intellectual exchanges, there is a 
plausible danger of fetishizing Reason and idealistic 
rationalism. Or jettisoning it in favor of nominalistic anti-
foundationalism such as that of Richard Rorty. But Peirce’s 
belief in a world outside of our minds, his scholastic 
realism, prevents this extremism. Concepts without 
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experienced material are vacuous; sense-data without 
concepts are blind. Rational activity connected to social 
interests entails action which, Dewey reflects, serves as an 
intermediary, modifying existence, “in that process of 
evolution whereby the existent comes more and more to 
embody generals’; in other words, “the process whereby 
the existent becomes, with the aid of action, a body of 
rational tendencies or of habits generalized as much as 
possible” (Dewey 1982, 25).  
 Moreover, Peirce’s revolutionary slogan, “Do not 
block the road of inquiry,” warrants also sanctioning “the 
one ordinance of Play, the law of liberty” (1998a, 436). It 
is this perspective that John Dewey (1969) applied to his 
critique of Leon Trotsky by stressing the indeterminacy of 
means in relation to ends previously agreed upon. Concrete 
historical situations overdetermine the means-ends nexus 
(Hook 2002, 152-53). Peirce’s stress on consequences, 
rational purport coordinated with universal principles, and 
the purposive bearings of any inquiry, testifies to his 
conviction in the feasibility of a transformed, ameliorated 
future. 
 As already discussed, Peirce did not engage in any 
sustained reflection on ethics or politics except for a few 
remarks on the normative sciences. Only Roberta 
Kevelson has speculated on the reciprocal interaction 
between Peirce’s Existential Graphs and utopic 
propositions dealing with political economy, in particular 
the modal graphs of possibility. Kevelson observes that “a 
cut of a graph may be an instance of a possible universe, 
or, in other words, a graph-replica in a kind of utopic 
representation, a possible of a figment of a possible” (1999, 
113). Space-time continuum, for Peirce, signifies lawful 
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evolution of knowledge analogous to evolution in nature 
which is characterized by the intrusion of chance breaks 
and accidental ruptures (as theorized by Peirce’s synechism 
and tychism (on synechism and science, see Haack 2008). 
Virtualities in the realm of potentiality supervene over 
actualities. Not everything is possible, but some are 
contingent on historical specificities and collective 
protagonists/personalities involved.  
 It bears repeating that the radicalism of Peirce’s 
realist dialectic is fully evinced in his repudiation of 
nominalism (exemplified in positivism, radical empiricism, 
deconstruction, etc.) which reduces the abstract to the 
sensory, the general to the individual. Peirce’s inaugural 
vision is contained in his critique of Berkeley. It addresses 
the rugged individualism prevalent in the 1870s when the 
utilitarian economics of Bentham and Marshall based on 
Ockham’s denial of universals and the positivist’s denial of 
religion and metaphysics (Murphey 1993, 100): “The 
question whether the genus homo has any existence except as 
individuals, is the question whether there is anything of any 
more dignity, worth and importance than individual 
happiness, individual aspirations, and individual life. 
Whether men really have anything in common, so that the 
community is to be considered as an end in itself, and if so, 
what the relative value of the two factors is, is the most 
fundamental practical question in regard to every public 
institutions the constitution of which we have it in our 
power to influence” (1992, 105).  
 We cannot over-emphasize Peirce’s socialist 
commitment. The individual mind, for Peirce, signifies 
fallibility: “The individual man, since his separate existence 
is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he is 
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anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they 
are to be, only a negation” (quoted in Murphey 1993, 175; 
see also Ketner 1998, 325; Colapietro 1989). This negation, 
however, can be a powerful matrix for affirmation, as 
witness the mutable occasions featuring Patrick Henry’s 
words which, if decoded properly by a scientifically-
minded collective agency, are capable of stoking the fires 
of revolutionary struggle across the oceans. 
 In the context of the search for concrete universals 
in ordinary experience, Peirce’s humanistic communalism 
proves to be an open-ended, imaginatively creative 
approach to analyzing sociopolitical problems. His 
methodology of “critical commonsensism,” combined 
with meaning-critical realism, rooted in a community of 
interpreters serves an emancipatory socialist-oriented goal 
(Apel 1981). Peirce subscribes to the Enlightenment 
principle of autonomy and self-controlled conduct. It 
affirms an earlier anti-Cartesian insight that there are no 
intuitive cognitions, and all hypothetical propositions are 
tentative and fallible. In this context, freedom is possible 
only in an objective inquiry into an impersonal truth about 
nature and society whose institutions and processes are 
always under construction.  
 Modern science has no self-authenticating, a priori 
foundations, only the quest for methods of discovery and 
proof. Likewise, nothing is self-authenticating for Peirce as 
he muses on the constellation of self, nature, and law; and 
thus, “the dialectic of moral life is set up, between 
inclinations rooted in flesh and moral duty grounded in 
reason.  Freedom depends both on there being that 
dialectic and on our choosing morality over inclination. 
But this depends on the moral law not being arbitrary” 
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(Short 2007, 346).  Peirce also held that “By the ‘practical,’ 
I mean everything that is possible through freedom” 
(Murphey 1993, 177). Scientists may be at sea, but not for 
long. Land, the harbor, looms ahead. Just as that piece of 
paper with Patrick Henry’s words on liberty was not self-
authenticating until it passed into the zones of Secondness 
and Thirdness, Peirce’s philosophy remains to be 
investigated in the same spirit of risky adventure that he 
expressed in his 1905 letter to William James, who initially 
introduced Peirce’s pragmaticism into the world with all its 
unpredictable consequences (note the sea metaphor 
recalling our specimen of Peirce’s intervention): “There is 
nothing, however, more wholesome for us than to find 
problems that quite transcend our powers and I must say, 
too, that it imparts a delicious sense of being cradled in the 
waters of the deep—a feeling I always have at sea” (quoted 
in Short 2007, 347). Terra incognita, “concrete 
reasonableness” as utopia, remains to be discovered, 
understood, and fully appreciated. 
 
 
References 
 
 
Adorno, Theodor.  2017.  An Introduction to Dialectics.  New 
York: Polity. 
 
Appel, Karl-Otto.  19995.  Charles S. Peirce: From Pragmatism 
to Pragmaticism.   New Jersey: Humanities 
Press. 
 
Bernstein, Richard J.  1960.  “Introduction” to John 
Dewey, On Experience, Nature and Freedom,  ix-
xlvii. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company. 
 
——. 1971.  Praxis and Action.  Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press. 
 
——.  2010.  The Pragmatic Turn.  New York: Polity. 
 
 
 
34 
                                       E. SAN JUAN 
                                           MABINI REVIEW          I           VOLUME 7 (2018) 
 
 
Bhaskar, Roy.  1983. “Dialectics.”  In A Dictionary of Marxist 
Thought, ed. Tom   Bottomore, 122-
29.  Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University 
Press. 
 
——. 1993. Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom.  New York: 
Verso. 
 
Bochenski, I.M. 1969.  Contemporary European Philosophy.  
Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
 
Brent, Joseph.  1998.  Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life.  
Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 
 
Colapietro, Vincent.  1989.  Peirce’s Approach to the Self.  
Albany: State University of New York Press. 
 
De Waal, Cornelis.  2013. Peirce: A Guide for the Perplexed.  
New York: Bloomsbury. 
 
Dewey, John.  1969.  “Means and Ends.”  In Their Morals 
and Ours.  New York: Merit Publishers. 
 
——. 1982.  “The Development of American 
Pragmatism.”  In Pragmatism: The  Classic 
Writings, ed. H.S. Thayer.  Indianapolis, IN: 
Hackett Publishing    Co. 
 
Dussel, Enrique. 2013. Ethics of Liberation.  Durham: Duke 
University Press. 
 
Feibleman, James. 1969. An Introduction to the Philosophy of 
Charles S. Peirce.   Cambridge, MA: MIT 
Press. 
 
Findlay, J.N. 1958.  The Philosophy of Hegel.  New York: 
Colier Books. 
 
Flew, Anthony.  1979.  A Dictionary of Philosophy.  New 
York: St Martin’s Press. 
 
Foot, Philippa, ed.  1967.  Theories of Ethics.  New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Francisco, Luzviminda.  1987. “The Philippine-American 
War.”  In The Philippines Reader, ed. Daniel B. 
Schirmer and Stephen Shalom.  Boston: 
 South End Press. 
 
 
 
35 
                           PEIRCE’S ETHICS 
MABINI REVIEW      I       VOLUME 7 (2018) 
 
Gallie, W.B.  1952. Peirce and Pragmatism.  Middlesex, UK: 
Penguin Books. 
 
Garraty, John and Peter Gay.  1972.  The Columbia History 
of the World.  New York:  Harper and Row. 
 
Gramsci, Antonio.  1971.  Selections from the Prison Notebooks.  
New York: International Publishers. 
 
Haack, Susan.  2008.  Putting Philosophy to Work. Amherst, 
NY: Promethetus    Books. 
 
Hegel, G.W.F. . 1904.  The Logic of Hegel.  UK: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
——. 1977. Phenomenology of Spirit. Tr. A.V. Miller.  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Heller, Agnes.  1984.  Radical Philosophy.  New York: Basil 
Blackwell. 
 
Hoftstadter, Richard.1967.  The Paranoid Style in American 
Politis and Other Essays.  New York: Vintage 
Books. 
 
Hook, Sidney.  2002.  Towards the Understanding of Karl Marx.  
Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books. 
 
Hookway, Christopher. 1985.  Peirce. New York: 
Routledge. 
 
Hoopes, James, ed.  Peirce on Signs.  Chapel Hill: University 
of North Carolina   Press. 
 
James, William.  1971.  “The Philippine Tangle.” A William 
James Reader, ed. Gay Wilson Allen.  Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co. 
 
——.1982.  “What Pragmatism Means.”  In Pragmatism: The 
Classic  Writings, ed. J.S. Thayer.  
Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 
 
Kaufmann, Walter. 1972.  “The Hegel Myth and Its 
Method.”  In Hegel, ed. Alasdair MacIntyre, 21-
60.  New York: Anchor Books. 
 
Kaplan, Abraham.  1961.  The New World of Philosophy.  New 
York: Vintage Books. 
 
 
 
 
36 
                                       E. SAN JUAN 
                                           MABINI REVIEW          I           VOLUME 7 (2018) 
 
Ketner, Kenneth Laine.  1998. His Glassy Essence.  
Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press. 
 
Kevelson, Roberta.  1999. Peirce and the Mark of the Gryphon.  
New York: St. Martin’s Press. 
 
Kolakowski, Leszek.  1969. The Alienation of Reason.  New 
York: Anchor Books. 
 
Kolko, Gabriel.  1984.  Main Currents in Modern American 
History.  New York: Pantheon. 
 
Liszka, James.  2012.  “Charles Peirce on Ethics.”  In The 
Normative Thought of Charles S.. Peirce, edited by 
Cornelis de Waal and Krzysztof  Skowronski.  
New York: Fordham University Press. 
 
Lukacs, Georg. 1971.  History and Class Consciousness.  
London, UK: Merlin Press. 
 
Lukes, Steven.  1987.  Marxism and Morality.  New York: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
Mackay, Donald. S.  1950.  “Pragmatism.”  In A History of 
Philosophical Systems,” ed. Vergilius Ferm.  New 
York: The Philosophical Library. 
 
Marx, Karl and Frederick Engels. 1968.  Selected Works.  
New York: International Publishers. 
 
Menand, Louis.  2001.  The Metaphysical Club.  New York: 
Farrar, Straus &  Giroux. 
 
Miller, Stuart Creighton. 1982. “Benevolent Assimilation”. The 
American Conquest of the Philippines, 1899-1903.  
New Haven: Yale University Press. 
 
Misak, Cheryl.  2004.  “C.S. Peirce on Vital Matters.”  In 
The Cambridge Companion to Peirce.  UK: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Muller, John and Joseph Brent, eds.  Peirce, Semiotics, and 
Psychoanalysis.  Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press. 
 
Mure, G. R. G. 1940.  An Introduction to Hegel. Oxford, UK: 
Clarendon Press. 
 
 
 
37 
                           PEIRCE’S ETHICS 
MABINI REVIEW      I       VOLUME 7 (2018) 
 
Murphey, Murray.  1993.  The Development of Peirce’s 
Philosophy.  Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Co. 
 
Ollman, Bertell.  2003.  Dance of the Dialectic.  Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press. 
 
Peirce, Charles S.  1931-1935.  Collected Papers of Charles 
Sanders Peirce. [hereafter CP] Vols. 1-IV., ed. 
Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
 
——.  1979.  The New Elements of Mathematics, ed. Carolyn 
Eisele. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities 
Press. 
 
——. 1992.  Reasoning and the Logic of Things.  Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
——.  1997.  Pragmatism as a Principle and Method of Right 
Thinking, ed. Patricia Ann Turrisi.  Albany, 
NY: SUNY Press. 
 
——.  1998a. The Essential Peirce, ed, by Nathan Houser. 2 
Volumes. Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press. 
 
——. 1998b  The Essential Writings.  Amherst,NY: 
Prometheus Books. 
 
Putnam, Hilary. 1992.  “Comment on the Lectures.” In 
Charles Sanders Peirce,  Reasoning and the 
Logic of Things, ed. Kenneth L. Ketner, 55-104.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
 
Rosenthal, M. & P. Yudin, eds. 1967. A Dictionary of 
Philosophy. Moscow: Progress Pulishers. 
 
Sahakian, William.  1963.  Systems of Ethics and Value Theory.  
New York: Philosophical Library. 
 
San Juan, E.  2017.  “Pragmaticism and Marxism: Project 
for a Dialogue.” In Filipinas Everywhere.  
Brighton, UK: Sussex Academic Press. 
 
Scheffler, Israel.  1974.  Four Pragmatists.  New York: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
 
 
 
 
 
38 
                                       E. SAN JUAN 
                                           MABINI REVIEW          I           VOLUME 7 (2018) 
 
Short, T. L.  2007.  Peirce’s Theory of Signs.  New York: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Singer, Peter, ed.  Ethics.  New York: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Smith, John.  1966.  The Spirit of American Philosophy.  New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Somerville, John.  1967.  The Philosophy of Marxism: An 
Exposition.  New York: Random House.   
 
Talisse, Robert and Scott F. Aikin. 2008.  Pragmatism: Guide 
for the Perplexed.  New York: Continuum. 
 
Taylor, Charles..  1975.  Hegel.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Thompson, Manley.  1953.  The Pragmatic Philosophy of C.S. 
Peirce.  Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Trotsky, Leon.  1969.  Their Morals and Ours. New York: 
Merit Publishers. 
 
Ulam, Adam.  1973.  Stalin: The Man and His Era. New 
York: Viking. 
 
Weinberg,Julius and Keith Yandell.  1971.  Ethics.  New 
York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston. 
 
West, Cornel.  1989.  The American Evasion of Philosophy.  
Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 
 
Wheelwright, Philip.  1960.  The Way of Philosophy.  New 
York: Odyssey Press. 
 
Zinn, Howard.  1980.  A people’s history of the United States.  
New York: Harper Colophon. 
 
Zwick, Jim. 2007.  Confronting Imperialism.  West 
Comshohocken: Infinity  Publishing Co. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39 
                           PEIRCE’S ETHICS 
MABINI REVIEW      I       VOLUME 7 (2018) 
 
About the Author 
 
E. SAN JUAN, JR. graduated in 1958 as an A.B. magna 
cum laude from the University of the Philippines 
Diliman, Quezon City. On Fulbright fellowship, he 
obtained his PhD degree from Harvard University in 
1965. He was a professor of comparative literature, 
ethnic studies and cultural studies in the following 
universities:  University of California at Davis, 
University of Connecticut at Storrs, Brooklyn College of 
the City University of New York, Washington State 
University,  Wesleyan University, University of the 
Philippines, Ateneo de Manila, Bowling Green State 
University, Leuven University in Belgium, and National 
Tsing Hua University in Taiwan.   He was a professorial 
lecturer in cultural studies at Polytechnic University of 
the Philippines. 
 
 
 
 
